The effects of changes in the discount factor as compared with the effects of changes in risk aversion are examined for a simple stochastic model of fish population dynamics. Numerical results suggest that both optimal harvesting strategies and the resulting population dynamics are insensitive to changes in the discount factor. whereas changes in the degree of risk aversion in the utility function do cause significant changes in both. When risk averse utility functions are viewed as total revenue curves with marginal prices that decrease with supply, the results suggest that the more sensitive price is to supply, then the resulting optimal harvesting policy is smoother. Theoretical results are presented which suggest these results are robust beyond the specific model.
THE standard literature (see Clark 1976 Clark , 1980 Anderson 1977 ; and references therein) on dynamic, deterministic fishery optimization models has stressed the importance of the discount factor ( 1 / ( 1 + I ) . where i is the interest rate) in determining optimal harvesting strategies. The discount factor has been emphasized because an optimal harvesting strategy depends continuously on the discount factor. and a stock will be optimally harvestcd to extinction if the rate of growth of the population is less than the rate of discount (Reed 1974; Clark 1976 ). Related results have been established for stochastic harvesting models (Reed 1974; Mendelssohn 1980b: Mendelssohn and Sobel 1980) . though in a stochastic model the population dynamics may drive the population to cxtinction even though the harvest levels have not left the remaining population at or near zero. The presumed sensitivity of an optimal harvesting strategy to changes in the discount factor is important, as a standard procedure for representing increased risk to a manager of a fishery in face of uncertainty is to decrease the discount factor. Even at first glance this is a naive approach. as it assumes a constant attitude towards risk regardless of the initial population size or harvest decision.
What would appear to be a more sophisticated approach towards risk is to assess the manager's utility function and use this as the objective function. This approach to managing fisheries and other natural resources is given in Hilborn and Walters (1977) . Keeney (1977). and Holling (1978) ; a general discussion can be found in Keency and Raiffa ( 1976) .
One way to compare these differing approaches is to see how changes in the discount factor and changes in the degree of risk aversion affect the policy that should be followed. In this paper this is done for one empirical stochastic model of a fishery. In particular, the actual sensitivity of an optimal harvesting strategy to changes in the discount factor is compared with its sensitivity to changes in the degree of risk aversion in the utility function. Further changes in the population dynamics of a stock being managed under an optimal harvesting policy are examined as both the discount factor and the degree of risk aversion vary. Also, the appendix presents theoretical results which suggest the numerical results presented are robust over a wide class of models.
The Model
The model to be analyzed is a stochastic version of a Ricker spawner-recruit curve put forward by Mathews (1967) for salmon runs in Bristol Bay. Let x, be the recruits in period f , and y, the spawners. If x is observed and a decision v is taken, a one-period utility g(x, y ) is received. Without loss of generality, g(+. ?) can be the expected value (over the random variable 8) of some other utility h(x, y . 8). Hence the model indirectly includes economic uncertainty.
The utility in period t is discounted by a factor p, 0 5 p < I . The recruits in period t + I are a random function of the spawners in period t and a random variable d,
where N ( 0 , uz) denotes a random variable that follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance u'.
The problem is to maximize the expected discounted utility.
(2) maximize
such that x, 2 y , 2 0; Eq. ( I ) .
Computational techniques for solving Eq. (2) and related policy questions are discussed in Mendelssohn (1980b) . A 100-point grid is used with no absorbing (zero) population size.
Two different utility functions are examined for g(x, y ) . The first is v , = 0.5 In (x, -y , ) while the second is v2 = (x, -y,)", for A = 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.95, 1 .O. These utility functions are plotted in Fig. 1 . Utility functions are said to be absolute risk averse (Merton 1969 (Merton , 1971 Keeney and Raiffa 1976) 
Basically, a utility function is risk averse if a certain return is preferred to a lottery with equal or greater value in expectation.
The two utility functions vI and v2 are members of the HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk averse) family of utility functions (Merton 1969 (Merton , 1971 . In particular, if R , is the measure of absolute risk aversion, and Rz is the measure of relative risk aversion, then for vI. R l = 1/z and Rz = I ; for v2. R I = ( I -A)/z and Rz = 1 -A, where I = x -y is the amount harvested. Both v , and v2 have constant rclative risk with respect to the amount harvested. However, it is clear that the relative risk aversion for v2 changes linearly with A. Hence A is a measure of the relative degree of risk aversion. For A approaching zero, the manager is totally risk averse, whereas for A = I the manager is risk neutral. The utility function v1 is the limiting case of wz as A approaches zero.
The utility functions v I and v2 are not as rich as they might be given that they only depend on (x,, y , ) through z, = .r, -y,. However. there exists little empirical basis for choosing more complicated utility functions that can be given meaningful, practical interpretations. Both vI and v2 can be viewed as total revenue curves. Taking derivatives vI' = 0.5/z ( v z . = Az"-') and w , -= -0.5/zz (respectively, ( I -A)z"').
The first derivative is the marginal price for a supply of z units of fish, with the marginal price decreasing with increasing supply. Therefore, using v , and vz as the one-period utility functions can be viewed as examining the effect of dropping the usual economic assumption of perfect competition. This is treated analytically in some detail in Mendelssohn and Sobel (1980) . It is worth emphasizing that "risk" is used here in a very specific way. In some papers, risk is used to denote the randomness in the population dynamics. Here, it is assumed that all random variation in the population is contained in the random variable d. No effort is made to discuss the actual merits or accuracy of Mathew's model. Instead the model is taken as given.
Also, sometimes risk is used to denote undesirable events that could happen to the population that are not directly reflected in the utility function. The risk of extinction or of very small population sizes is one such example. This problem is treated in Mendelssohn (1978) .
Risk in this paper denotes the gamble the decision maker faces in the certain reward of the given return function (in this case harvest) this period versus the uncertain return next period. The return function is assumed,given. For many problems, the choice of the appropriate return function is crucial (Mendelssohn 1980b).
Results
Optimal harvesting policies and the resulting population -lv,(t) when starting in each state, for p = 0.99 and p = 0.925.
Despite the fact that almost identical sample paths are generated by the two optimal harvesting strategies, the change in the valuation of the sample paths is dramatic.
There has been much discussion in the fisheries literature , I = I on the appropriate value of the discount factor (Walters 1975; Clark 1976; Walters and Hilborn 1976; Holling 1978) . This discussion can be divided into two components-the discount factor that should be used to evaluate the fishery by an external agency such as a government agency (say to compare the benefits derived from a stream enhancement project) or a private individual (when making an entry decision, for example) and that used by the fishery manager to set policy, bearing in mind the effects harvest policy will have on the former decisions. If the previous empirical results are robust, they suggest that the fishery manager need not worry greatly about the exact choice of the discount factor used for determining policy, and that this choice will have little bearing on entry decisions or enhancement projects. This is because a nearly optimal expected present value will be found over a broad range of discount factors that might be used by the external agents. Unlike the case for changes in p, the cumulative harvest distributions when A varies differ by as much as 8%. and at the most probable harvest sizes, by about 5-68. These differences are small but significant; the smaller values of A can be seen to produce a "smoother" harvest in the long run. These results can best be explained by considering the economic interpretation of the utility functions. At A = 1, the price does not vary with supply (in fact it is p = I , which can be viewed as the normalized price); therefore a harvest policy is based entirely on being as close as possible to the point of largest overall expected growth. However, at A = 0.05, at low populations, the higher price (i.e. the higher risk) makes it desirable to harvest some now (i.e. the risk makes it desirable to obtain some amount of certain return now). At higher population levels, a balance must be maintained between a desirable price and future growth. For y 2 I .89 X IO', the expected value of I,+, is less than y , . Harvesting more now lowers the present marginal price per unit of fish, but increases the probability (i.e. decreases the risk) of larger population sizes next period (i.e. of small. unprofitable harvests next period).
The problem of unsmooth harvests from random populations is discussed in Mendelssohn (1976 Mendelssohn ( . 1980a Mendelssohn ( . 1980b ), Beddington and May (1977). and May et al. (1978) . These empirical results suggest that unsrnooth harvests have been found in the past because no effort has been made to include in management policies either attitudes towards risk, or marginal prices that are sensitive to supply. A reasonable conjecture is that all other things being equal, for a properly 'managed random fishery, wider fluctuations in catch will be. expected either if outside supplies affect prices or if the entire quota cannot be taken by the fleet. Conversely, smaller fluctuations will be expected when the marginal price is very sensitive to the supply of the managed stock of fish only. Inventories can be viewed as an outside supply that affects (2) offers some insights into relative risk aversion and planning horizons when optimal policies are followed. This is because Eq. (2) can be solved by solving the following sequence of recursive equations:
where n denotes the number of periods remaining in the planning horizon. For Eq. (2), eachf,,(*) is concave and continuous (Mendelssohn and Sobel 1980) , and hence each is a risk averse utility. Eachf,,(x) is the utility of having x units of fish when there are n periods left when following crn optimnl policy. Hencef,,'(x) is the marginal value of onc additional unit of fish with ti periods remaining, and the two risk averse measures R , and R z can be calculated as n changes (derivatives are approximated by finite differences) ( Table I ). The measure R z reflects thc relative risk aversion faced by the decision maker given the actual sample paths that will occur when following an optimal policy. What is noticeable is that the relative risk forf,, is much less than that for v2. that it increases with n. and that it quickly becomes stationary after three to five periods. An optimal harvesting policy reduces the relative risk of the decision maker. Moreover, the effective planning horizon for these problems appears to be 3-5 yr. after which both policy, risk, and preferences remain stationary.
The measure of relative risk K z can be seen to be almost a measure of elasticity of the present marginal value of a unit of fish. As an optimal policy "smooths out" the supply of fish, the elasticity of the value per unit of fish decreases.
Conclusions
Any conclusions to be drawn fron, thcse results must be tempered by the realization that the results are derived from only limited numerical experimentation. However, the appendix presents theoretical results which suggest that over a broad class of stochastic harvesting models large changes in the discount factor produce only very small changes in an optimal harvesting policy. Hence. there is rcason to believe the numerical results arc in fact robust.
The numerical results suggest that policy often is insen\;-tive to changes in the discount factor over ii range of valuch likely to be found in practice. Discount factors may adequately represent intertemporal preferences for a dollar now versus an expected dollar in the future. but they do not sccm to capture the attitude towards the degree of gamble in obtaining that expected dollar in the future.
Moreover, when the utility functions are viewed as total revenue curves with marginal price sensitive to supply. the results suggest that for optimally managed fisheries highly supply-sensitive prices will lead to stabilized harvests, whether the fishery is economically or biologically stochastic. As most if not all fisheries arc stochastic. the usual assumption of perfect competition in fishery economic model5 and the lack of attention to risk preferences limit the usefulness of the results derived from these models.
External decisions for a fishery. such a5 entry decisions and enhancement projects. depend on the valuation of the fishery. The valuation of the fishery depends on the utility function used, the discount factor used, and the sample paths of the random harvest stream. Usually, the fishery manager can only control this last aspect through harvesting policy. The results of this paper suggest that under optimal management, misspecification of the discount factor in determining the optimal harvesting policy will have little effect on the extcrnal decisions of other parties.
Finally, as the degree of risk aversion increases, the amount harvested is not strictly nondecreasing for all population sizes. This seemingly is in contradiction with the results of Cropper (1976). The numerical results yield an intuitive explanation of why Cropper's result is not correct for this problem.
